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Abstract 
Negli ultimi sessant’anni, le politiche di aiuto allo sviluppo economico dei paesi poveri hanno 
avuto come base fondante l’Official Development Assistance (ODA), una forma di sostegno 
principalmente monetario offerta dai paesi membri della Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) dell’OECD, veicolato da agenzie per lo sviluppo o come supporto diretto al budget 
nazionale. Forte dell’attuale crisi economica, della necessità di razionalizzare gli investimenti 
pubblici e di risultati spesso contrastanti ed inconcludenti delle politiche umanitarie, oggi una 
buona parte dell’economia accademica e governativa si interroga sulla loro reale efficacia nel 
portare crescita e alleviamento della povertà nelle economie più povere.  
Nonostante l’incremento del volume di ODA nell’ultimo ventennio, rallentatosi solo dal 
2009, gli studiosi di Economia dello Sviluppo sono divisi riguardo la loro reale efficacia: 
alcuni, tra cui Burnside and Dollar (2000), ne teorizzano un effetto positivo condizionato alle 
politiche economiche, all’apertura del mercato ed all’efficienza fiscale. Altri, tra i quali 
Easterly e Moyo, arrivano a negarne ogni utilità ed, anzi, accusano l’ODA di agire da 
deterrente alla crescita duratura di queste economie, fomentandone la corruzione, lo spreco e 
la dipendenza economica. Per queste argomentazioni, a cui fanno seguito risultati empirici 
spesso contrastanti, Mosley (1987) definisce l’ODA un Micro-Macro Paradosso, poiché casi 
locali di successo non permettono di affermare in modo assoluto l’efficacia di una politica 
macroeconomica basata sugli aiuti sovrani. Posso esserne infatti delineate numerose criticità 
strutturali: la loro erogazione secondo indicatori economici arbitrari e facilmente 
manipolabili; gli effetti potenzialmente deleteri sulla competitività dell’economia (si parla in 
tal senso di Resource Curse); le motivazioni strategiche dei donatori; un approccio da alcuni 
ritenuto sbagliato e con obiettivi troppo ambiziosi; le specificità legate al tipo di donatore o 
destinatario; gli effetti deleteri del Tied Aid; il rischio di fomentare il conflitto sociale e 
politico; l’evidenza di una diminuzione della contendibilità politica e di una crescita della 
corruzione; lo sperpero di tali risorse. 
A fianco di tali effetti collaterali, si possono individuare anche imperfezioni nel modo in cui 
l’efficacia dell’ODA viene matematizzata e misurata nella letteratura economica: il rischio 
che gli aiuti allo sviluppo vengano misurati attraverso una variabile endogena al modello 
econometrico, non catturandone l’esatta causalità sulla crescita economica; la scarsa 
attenzione spesso dedicata alla scelta delle varabili, ed in caso di dati empirici alla scelta dei 
campioni; spesso, infine, non viene riconosciuto nei modelli il ruolo cruciale delle istituzioni 
e le politiche adottate dal paese ricevente gli aiuti.  
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Importante è però, a mio parere, non focalizzarsi solo sulla capacità dell’ODA di accrescere il 
PIL delle economie destinatarie, ma invece estendere l’analisi ad un più ampio concetto di 
sviluppo, che comprenda anche l’aiuto alla riduzione della povertà (in estensione e 
profondità), la qualità istituzionale, il benessere soggettivo, l’accesso alle risorse fondamentali 
per citarne alcuni: solo in questo modo è possibile dare un giudizio consapevole. Per questo  
motivo, diventa sempre più importante adottare una politica di sviluppo integrata, che agli 
aiuti finanziari affianchi investimenti in altri potenziali fattori di crescita, quali il supporto ad 
buon governo, l’adozione di buone policies, il riconoscimento dell’autonomia dei paesi 
destinatari nell’autodeterminazione del percorso di sviluppo, ma al tempo stesso la 
definizione di condizioni da rispettare.  
Analizzando i casi del Botswana, della Somalia e del Piano Marshall, che ci offrono spaccati 
molto diversi, risulta quindi che la fotografia sull’efficacia dell’ODA presenta ben più 
sfumature di quante ne potremmo immaginare. Accantonando le risposte facili, gli esempi e le 
riflessioni sopra citati ci offrono numerosi spunti per valutare ed, in parte, riprogettare gli aiuti 
sovrani allo sviluppo, affiancandoli ad altre forme innovative ed emergenti di sostegno alla 
crescita economica, consapevoli che non esiste un’unica ricetta per la crescita ma diversi 
percorsi da esplorare. 
 
  
5 
 
Table of contents 
 
1. General overview on Official Development Assistance ..................................................... 7 
1.1 Size of foreign aid ........................................................................................................ 9 
1.2 The path of aid debate ................................................................................................ 10 
2. Limits and pitfalls in ODA effectiveness .......................................................................... 13 
2.1. Dependence from arbitrary factors ............................................................................ 13 
2.2. Aid as Resource Curse ............................................................................................... 13 
2.3. Strategic motives ........................................................................................................ 16 
2.4. Influence of donor and recipient’s characteristics ..................................................... 17 
2.5. Tied aid ...................................................................................................................... 18 
2.6. Wrong approach: planners versus searchers .............................................................. 19 
2.7. Fostering social conflict ............................................................................................. 23 
2.8. Contributing to political unaccountability and corruption ......................................... 24 
2.9. Increasing waste spending ......................................................................................... 24 
3. Limits in models evaluating existing aid........................................................................... 26 
3.1. Endogeneity of aid ..................................................................................................... 26 
3.2. Poor evaluation and model design ............................................................................. 26 
3.3. Omitted variable bias: policies and institutions ......................................................... 28 
4. Looking beyond growth: ODA and development ............................................................. 29 
4.1. Poverty ....................................................................................................................... 29 
4.2. Education ................................................................................................................... 31 
4.3. Health ......................................................................................................................... 32 
4.4. Alternative measures of wealth .................................................................................. 32 
4.5. Monetary inequality ................................................................................................... 33 
4.6. Inequality of opportunities ......................................................................................... 33 
4.7. Institutional quality .................................................................................................... 33 
5. Unraveling the paradox: successful and unsuccessful cases ............................................. 35 
5.1. Botswana’s success story ........................................................................................... 35 
5.2. Somalia: a story of conflict ........................................................................................ 37 
5.3. Marshall Plan and the origin of ODA ........................................................................ 39 
5.3.1. Historical background......................................................................................... 40 
5.3.2. Impact on Economic Growth .............................................................................. 44 
5.3.3. Differences with contemporary ODA ................................................................ 47 
6 
 
6. Policy recommendations and perspectives ........................................................................ 52 
References ................................................................................................................................ 54 
 
  
7 
 
Over the last sixty years, Foreign Aid has been considered the most effective strategy in 
alleviating poverty in the Least Developed Countries (LDC). In this timeframe, delivery 
channels, modality and aid strategies have evolved, under guidelines given by major 
international institutions: United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank. 
Still, the poorest part of the world suffers from hardships and is lagging behind in wealth and 
living conditions, raising questions about the real utility of foreign aid. In this paper I want to 
investigate the effectiveness of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in increasing 
economic growth in recipient countries. 
1. General overview on Official Development Aid 
 
Generally, Foreign Aid can be distinguished between Humanitarian Aid, targeted on crisis 
interventions, with a short term horizon and primarily consisting on medicines, food and 
logistics, and Development Aid, aiming at building longer-term development and consisting 
from its institutional foundation by in-kind aid (consisting of specific goods and equipments) 
and financial aid. Within the latter category, we take into consideration Official Development 
Assistance, which is the devolution of a country’s budget share to support developing 
countries, differently from Official Assistance, addressed to richer countries, and from Private 
Voluntary Assistance, made of individuals’ and NGO donations (World Bank). 
ODA, as defined by the World Bank, is performed by official agencies of the members of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), by multilateral institutions, and by non-DAC and 
addressed to countries and territories in the DAC list of ODA recipients (World Bank). 
Traditionally, such aid consisted of financial support, but official donors have recently 
engaged also in innovative and more proactive forms of ODA, by providing technical 
expertise and advice, or even training local technicians to transfer professional knowledge. 
During the years, DAC has continuously refined the definition of ODA reporting rules, in 
order to guarantee a common and consistent definition of what can be considered within such 
wide category. The boundary of ODA today include military aid, peacekeeping, some kind of 
cultural programs which contribute to build human capital and even nuclear energy, if used 
for civilian purposes (OECD.org). 
 
The main sources of ODA are single ODA budgets allocated by each donor country.  OECD 
has assessed in 1970, and repeatedly endorsed later, a minimum level of ODA/GNI (i.e. gross 
national income) at 0.7%; although almost all DAC members (with exception of Switzerland 
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and USA) accepted the rate, the average nowadays is still around 0.3%, with northern 
European countries performing better than others (OECD.org).  
 
Source: OECD-DAC (2012) 
 
ODA can be delivered through bilateral or multilateral aid. The former, consisting in a direct 
flow donor-recipient country, in 2014 still made 60% of total ODA from DAC countries, with 
approximately 95 out of 137 billion $ (OECD QWIDS, 2016). The latter, wherein aid flows 
from donor countries to international multilateral agencies which convey it to receiving 
countries, represented the remaining 40%. A minimal part of ODA flow, around 2 billion $ in 
2014, is finally delivered to recipients trough support of private donor (OECD QUIDS, 2016).  
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Source: OECD 
1.1. Size of foreign aid 
As shown below, ODA has been steady in the sixties, during the period of post- colonial 
adjustment, and rose up from the 70s, gaining  interest of economists and governments. 
Between 1992-1996, the so-called “aid fatigue”, it collapsed, to take again the growth track 
from 1996 and later with Millennium Development Goals. A new season of re-found 
optimism has begun, with participation of emerging Asian economies as donors (OECD-
DAC, 2016).  
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Source: OECD-DAC (2014) available at http://stats.oecd.org/qwids 
 
1.2. The path of aid debate 
We can identify four generations of studies on the relationship between aid, growth and 
development (Arndt, Jones, Tarp, 2010).  The first, between 1960s and 1980s, based its 
studies on the simple growth model by Harrod- Domar and the assumption that investment in 
physical capital linearly produces growth, making it easy to define the aid needed to hit a 
target. The second, between 1980s and 1990s, focused on same themes and led to encouraging 
results of aid impact. The main theory among these is “Micro Macro Paradox” by Mosley 
(1987), arguing that in spite of local positive results, there is no macro-level proof of 
effectiveness of aid on growth. Other economists, such as Easterly, strengthened the 
skepticism on physical capital investment and widened the spectrum of factors to be 
considered: good policies incentives,  general policy environment, state of economy and price 
competitiveness. The problem of endogeneity of aid also emerged, complicating the analysis: 
that is, aid level is not determined out of the growth model, but is rather an effect, so that poor 
countries receive more aid because of their poor performances, while richer countries are 
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destined with lower aid levels. From the 1990s, a third generation of studies stepped in, using 
panel data and a range of more sophisticated econometrical tools. They expanded upon aid 
endogeneity and supposed a non-linear relationship with growth, as suggested by Burnside 
and Dollar’s cornestone (2000). Others argued that results were not robust and did not hold, 
and extended the dataset size (Easterly, Levine, Roodman, 2004); someone recognized the 
extreme variability in results by using different methodology and concluded that aid may 
affect growth but is not a decisive factor, interacting with other variables (Roodman, 2007). 
Recently, a fourth generation has revived the “Micro Macro Paradox”, denying a robust effect 
of aid on aggregate level (Rajan and Subramian, 2008) and replacing previous macro-
researches with small-scale and delimited studies, which only can lead to statistically 
significant effects (Arndt and Channing, 2010). Still, a macro-economic analysis on ODA 
effect is necessary, to justify developed countries’ ongoing allocation of resources of national 
budgets to their citizens in times of financial and economic crisis, in times when some label 
aid “the biggest single inhibitor of Africa’s growth” (Moyo, 2009). 
To summarize, these are the main theses on debate ( Brempong and Racine, 2014): 
 
1) Aid has a positive effect on growth; evidences are inconclusive, since some good results 
(e.g. Mozambique, Uganda, Botswana in Radelet and Clemens, 2004) are 
counterbalanced by poor national cases (e.g. Haiti, Liberia, Democratic Republic of 
Congo in Radelet, Clemens and Bhavnani, 2004). 
 
2) Aid has no effect on growth and may be even counterproductive:  (Easterly, Levine, 
Roodman 2004, Moyo 2009, Rajan and Subramanian 2008): supported by national dismal 
cases (see above), but in contrast with historical proofs of effectiveness of aid such as the 
Marshall Plan, analyzed later (Burnside and Dollar, 2004). 
 
3) Aid has positive effects on growth only if conditioned with good local policies: such 
conditionality is represented by an interaction term “aid*policy” where policy is not 
under donors’ control and comprises trade openness, fiscal surplus and inflation and is 
significant in a panel of 56 countries between 1970-1993 (Burnside and Dollar 2000). 
Later expansions and robustness checks generally confirm the hypothesis (Easterly, 
Levine and Roodman (2002), Collier and Dollar 2002, Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 
Brempong and Racine, 2014). 
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In spite of improved models and empirical methodologies, the Micro-Macro Paradox is 
therefore still actual and keeps dividing studiers’ opinions. For instance, Arndt, Jones and 
Tarp (2010) in their revision of RS08 (Rayan and Subramanian, 2008), come to conclusion 
that, by improving specifications, instrumentation strategy and estimator, a positive robust 
effect of aid appears in the long run, while in short and middle-term horizons it is difficult to 
discern. Brempong and Racine (2014) using a non-parametric model and a large set of 
explanatory variables, to avoid bias for interaction with omitted variables, finds a U-shaped 
relation between aid and growth: at low levels of aid it is deleterious and starts to be effective 
after crossing a certain aid threshold, with increasing returns later on.  
 
I believe there are two main issues concerning aid debate: the critiques over determinants and 
factors that limit aid effectiveness on recipient countries, and the poor designing of evaluation 
models, that fail in giving a trustworthy statement about aid effects.  
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2. Limits and pitfalls in ODA effectiveness 
 
A branch of economists, among which Easterly, Moyo and Deaton, has criticized in recent 
years the effectiveness of aid, as it is currently modeled. Some of these critics challenge ODA 
policies in their design and goals, and deny that these can have a significant effect on 
economies of poor countries at all. Some others, on the other side, do not deny possible 
benefits foreign aid could produce, but point out distortive practices in both donor and 
recipient countries, which often undermine any potential positive outcome.  
 
2.1. Dependence from arbitrary factors 
A valid instrument used to regress the level of growth on the level of foreign aid is the ODA 
income threshold, measured in US dollar. It was set at 580$ in 1987 as rationalization 
criterion for ODA, since developmental resources got scarcer certain degree of selectivity had 
to be defined, and later adjusted yearly for inflation. Allowing for some income fluctuation, 
after three consecutive years over the threshold, the country is considered creditworthy and 
with lower ODA need (Galiani et al., 2014).  
For countries which cross this arbitrary measure from below, as shown on a panel data study 
on 35 poor developing countries between 1987 and 2010, the aid flow received decreases, 
even if no structural change occurs and the income increase was due to positive temporary 
shocks. Econometric models show a substantial aid decline after threshold-crossing of 92%, 
while effective graduation from aid would be endogenously determined also by good 
economic policies and performances. Since reducing aid has a sizeable negative effect on 
resource-constrained economies, it could harm growth: according to their model, 1% decrease 
of ODA/GNI causes a 0.0312% decrease of GDP (Galiani et al, 2014). 
Using an arbitrary threshold and not looking at real internal structural changes may also offer 
chances for recipients to manipulate data, in order to maintain aid reception.  
 
2.2. Aid as Resource Curse 
Burnside and Dollar (2000), in their studies referred to 1970-1993 period, find out that 
bilateral aid, being mainly fungible and not under tight control of donors, has a strong effect 
on government consumption, which promptly wastes resources supposed to be invested on 
structural growth. 
This resembles some similarities with what Auty defined to be the “Paradox of Plenty”, or 
“Resource Curse” (1993): the idea that a sudden unearned inflow of wealth, such as a natural 
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resource extraction, can be counter-intuitively damaging for growth, wiping off resources 
from the main manufacturing sectors. Djankov et al. (2008) support this idea and argue that 
ODA flow, as well as peaking rates of extractive activities, tourism or a sudden increase in 
foreign remittances, can be detrimental for a  nation’s economy, even more than an increase in 
oil rent. The economic explanation of such idea has been fully developed by Corden and 
Neary (1982) in their theory of the Dutch Disease, taking the name from macroeconomic 
problems affecting the Netherlands after a large natural gas discovery in the 1970s. They 
studiers consider a small open economy, not able to affect world prices and made of three 
sectors: the natural resource or booming sector, the tradable sector (e.g. agriculture and 
manufacturing), for which prices are set in the world market, and the non-tradable sector (e.g. 
services), for which prices are set in the domestic economy. The windfall gain arising in the 
booming sector has two simultaneous deleterious effects for such economy in the short run: a 
“spending effect”, that ultimately makes non resource export industries uncompetitive, and a 
“resource movement” effect, which shift investments in the new source of gain  (Corden and 
Neary, 1982). 
 
 
Dutch Disease applied to ODA flow 
Combined together, these mechanisms lead to the decay of the manufacturing exportable 
sector, which can be considered an important source of long-term economic growth (Jones 
and Olken, 2005). Rajan and Subramanian (2011), using an innovative within-country cross-
industry context instead of the cross-country methodology of previous studies, and therefore 
Sudden windfall gain from ODA flow
Resource movement effect
Production factors shift towards 
“booming” public sector
Higher aggregate demand
and spending
Higher prices in the non-
tradables sector
Increased demand for
domestic currency
Appreciation of real 
exchange rate 
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controlling for eventual country-specific variables, add new evidence to the fore mentioned 
theory.  The proof that the real exchange rate is the proximate factor through which aid has a 
shrinking effect on export sectors is the relative decrease of growth in value added, by 
comparing exportable and non exportable sectors in the same country (Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2011). They also find that such shrinkage effect for 1% increase in aid/GDP  
corresponds to a reduction in size of manufacturing sector of 0.2-0.3 %. 
However, the medium run effect may see an increase in productivity coming from non 
tradable factors, which could partially or totally offset the previous loss in competitiveness; 
therefore the overall effect cannot be determined a priori (Rajan and Subramanian, 2011). 
A trend of opinion among economists, looking at evidence of an uneven occurrence of the 
shrinkage of governmental investment among recipients, have suggested a “conditional 
version” of the resource curse: aid inflow could become harmful for economy only under 
certain recipient conditions only. The most commonly recognized conditions are weak and 
“grabber-friendly institutions” (Mehlum et al., 2006), lack of electoral competition (Andersen 
and Aslaksen, 2008), low levels of human capital (Ortega and De Gregorio, 2005), lack of 
economic freedom and competition (Farhadi et al., 2015).  
The size of unintended damages aid flow could produce depends strongly also on aid 
dependence, that is the extent to which recipients’ economies rely on it, other than simply 
receiving it (i.e. general aid abundance), so that the government cannot perform its core 
functions without. 
These two concepts are different but strongly related: ODA dependence is predominantly 
determined by abundance, but requires also a relatively small sized economy and an over-
reliance on the considered revenue source. While abundance is an exogenous factor, 
dependence is endogenously determined by governments choices. Some countries have been 
characterized by persistent aid dependence: for example, in Malawi, Ghana and Zambia 
foreign aid covered more than 40% of government expenditure between 1980s and 2000s 
(Brautigam and Knack, 2004 and Riddel, 2007). 
At this regard, many scholars such as Pedersen (2001) have argued that recipient governments 
deliberately set themselves in a condition of longing in order to qualify for aid; this is 
explained by the Samaritan’s Dilemma, introduced by Buchanan (1975). It tells us that, in a 
non-cooperative Stackelberg game between a wealthy altruistic country and a discretionally 
needy country which can decide (i.e. leader) wheter to use government revenues efficiently, if 
the latter (i.e. follower) decides first it will deliberately waste money, in order to oblige the 
rich country to donate aid. This model assumes that, being donor countries altruistic, the more 
16 
 
poverty they find in recipients, the more aid they are willing to give (Pedersen, 2001). It takes 
a quite simplified view, not considering that in repeated games donor government will 
condemn recipient’s waste, and donors themselves also moved by rather egoistic reasons.  
 
2.3. Strategic motives 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) in their paper show that, in many cases (except for Scandinavian 
countries), aid is not given looking at objective economic parameters and at the poorest’ 
needs, but according to other criterions, shown in the picture below (Miniou and Reddy, 
2006).  
 
Source: Alesina and Dollar (2000) “Who gives foreign aid to whom, and why?“ 
Journal of Economic Growth 5, 33-63 
 
Supportive of their result is the study by Qian (2014), which shows that the composition of 
top recipients has changed significantly between 1960-2013, not with priority to the poorest 
countries but rather because of other considerations. Indeed, aid to the poorest 20% of 
recipients makes up only 1.69% to 5.25% of total global aid (Qian, 2014). 
Alesina and Dollar (2000), on bilateral flow between 1970-1994, find that aid, notably for 
France and Portugal,  is positively associated with former colonial ties and tends to grow with 
the duration of colonization.  
Also Arndt, Jones and Tarp (2010) support the idea of a persistent donor strategy:  they argue 
however that the “colonizer” dummy is not usable as instrument to test whether a causal 
relationship exists between aid and growth, because it does not produce an orthogonal effect 
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on growth. Rather, each country has its own attitude in giving foreign aid with differently 
balanced and time-invariant criteria, treated as fixed effects (Arndt, Jones and Tarp, 2010). 
“Having same UN voting patterns” has a significant relative effect too, since it points out a 
deeper alignment in economic and geopolitical interests; donors may give more aid to 
recipients already allied, counting on the fact that they will use aid flow consistently with 
their same interests, or to acquire new allies (Alesina and Dollar, 2000). 
“Being democratic” plays a role too; evidence shows that countries which democratize can 
expect an increase in aid flow more than what countries turning authoritarian can expect in 
reduction; therefore there is strong proof of donor countries promoting democracy spreading 
(Alesina and Dollar, 2000).  
 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) and later Qian (2014) highlight that some delivery modalities of 
aid may give more margin for opportunistic interests: in allocation of bilateral aid, donor 
interest variables prevail over the effort to reward good policy, while this is not the case for 
multilateral aid, based on more objective data. This has to be taken into account, since 
bilateral aid still makes up around 60% of total ODA, with US, Japan, France and Germany 
accounting together for almost 70% of total flow (Alesina and Dollar, 2000).  
Differently, private donors and Foreign Direct Investors seem to reward economic openness 
more, since they are less influenced by political interests (Alesina and Dollar, 2000). 
2.4. Influence of donor and recipient’s characteristics  
A large field in economic literature states that donor and recipient countries’ characteristics 
influence results of aid flow. 
Recipient countries with a sound political system and better institutional quality invest aid 
more effectively, producing generally higher GDP growth (Burnside and Dollar, 2004) . 
Starting from 1990s, most of foreign aid favored well-performing governments: Burnside and 
Dollar suppose it could be a deliberate choice to reward good policies, or a consequence of a 
strategic Cold War logic, to breed new allied countries with whom to later establish trade 
relations. Finally, it makes easier for donor government to politically justify resource 
allocation if recipient country performs well, and to claim the status of “good donor” 
(Burnside and Dollar, 2004).  
Looking at agencies approach, we do not find one common attitude: US government, IMF and 
World Bank believe a tough approach should be used in exchange of aid, while UN argue that 
not all poor countries perform bad in governance and that they should be let free to develop 
their own strategies (Easterly, 2006). 
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Looking at the other side of the aid relationship, Easterly and Pfutze (2008) put attention on 
donors’ characteristics and try to define features of an ideal best-performing aid agency. 
According to the five variables (fragmentation, selectivity, ineffective channels, overhead 
costs and transparency) they provide an absolute and relative ranking of existing agencies; 
their results show fragmentation of aid towards many different destinations, with high 
overhead costs, overlapping interventions, and lack of specializations. To cite one for all, US 
is proven to provide foreign assistance through more than 50 different aid agencies (Brainard, 
2007, Easterly and Pfutze, 2008). 
They also denounce widespread non-disclosure about delivery targets and administrative 
costs, and excessively high operating costs even in some of the most important UN agencies 
(Easterly and Pfutze, 2008). 
All this can undermine aid effectiveness, because, given good intentions, delivery action is 
often fragmented, resources are drained to cover operating costs, economies of scale and 
scope are not fully implemented. 
Bearce and Tirone (2008), instead, state that aid can be effective only if donors’ strategic 
benefits deriving from aid are relatively small; in post-Cold War era, strategic motives have 
become less stringent, allowing donors to focus more on promoting proactive reforms and on 
defining reliable conditions, with the result of aid being more effective (Bearce and Tirone, 
2008).  
2.5. Tied aid 
Tied aid, carried on for many years by most donors, is defined as “official grants or loans that 
limit procurement to companies in the donor country or in a small group of countries”(OECD, 
2016). In this way, competitive mechanisms are hindered and countries are not let free to 
choose the most efficient and qualified provisions, often having to accept higher prices that 
impoverish their economy: part of potential benefits of ODA are therefore nullified. 
Researches prove that costs are raised between 15%- 30% on average and by 40% or more 
with tied food aid (Jepma, 1991 and OECD, 2006a). Benefits in term of increased trade for 
donor countries, on the other hand, seem to be limited (ODI, 2009). Such detrimental practice, 
largely adopted by US in the past, has recently stepped down thanks to international 
recommendations; still, technical cooperation (TC), largely offered in project aid, and food 
aid present considerable shares tied aid, 30% and 50% respectively (ODI, 2009). 
OECD/DAC Recommendation, assessing provisions to combat tied aid, suggests donor 
countries to convey funds through general budget support (GBS) and vertical funds, that 
 pursued (Easterly et al., 2003)
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Catching the momentum, as the MDG era has ended, UN  has launched the Sustainable 
Development Goals, endorsed in September 2015 and to be fulfilled by 2030. The agenda 
contains 17 ambitious goals, focused mainly on gender equality, private sector development 
and digitalization (UNDP, 2016). Although recognized as more detailed and realistic, some 
criticism remains.  
The approach towards development under such goals is based on development studies held by 
Jeffrey Sachs, special advisor of UN Secretary General, author of “The End of Poverty” and 
strong believer of developmental programs. The central argument in Sachs’ theory is the 
existence of a “poverty trap” in poor countries, which lead them to perpetuate in their state of 
misery by creating a vicious cycle, which reinforces poverty (Sachs, 2006). Such trap has 
three main forms: a saving trap, a demography trap and an infrastructure trap. 
With “saving trap”, Sachs refers to the lack of margin of income for poor country households 
to be invested for the future. 
The high child mortality rates, due to underdeveloped sanitation systems, and the lack of 
social security nets leads poor populations to rely on their offspring for their retirement 
maintenance. Children are considered an investment item and, since only a part of them 
survives, household fertility is disproportionately high, leading to more mouths to be fed: the 
so-called “demographic gap” (Sachs, 2006). 
Finally, in poor countries public investment in basic infrastructures is often launched but not 
completed, leading to unfinished structures that are not usable at all: such “infrastructure 
trap”, makes investments done useless, since money put in partly-built roads create no benefit 
at all and maintain an unfriendly environment for FDI and business development (Sachs, 
2006). 
Nevertheless, a “Big Push” of massive foreign aid can lift such countries out of their poverty 
trap, helping them to overcome the income threshold that would keep them in the reinforced 
poverty cycle. 
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 Source: OECD Qwids (2016) 
In order to attain the Big Push, Sachs in the UN Millennium Project suggests a range of 449 
interventions covering ideally all needs of poor peoples, in order to overcome 54 different 
barriers, to be all systematically implemented under UN coordination. Such plan has seemed 
attractive to donor countries in terms of cost and promised benefits. The Millennium Village 
Project, launched by UN in 2002 under Sachs’ guide, was designed to prove such hypothesis. 
It was made of 14 clusters of African villages, each undergoing a unique mix of interventions, 
for a total funding equal to the village’s income (UN Millennium Project, 2006).  Results are 
inconclusive: although it has raised average income and reduced poverty in many villages, 
villages out of intervention reached similar results, and doubts remain over methods used to 
select such community samples, being it not random. Clemens and Demombynes (2011) show 
that evaluation of estimates depends strongly on the method used: they highlight as 
weaknesses the small sample size of only fourteen village clusters, a short time horizon of 
only five years, and a lack of complete baseline data. Comparing results with villages in 
surrounding areas leads moreover to much more insignificant results than using a before-
versus-after comparison. Still, the latter does not represent a rigorous evaluation of the 
project, since it lack of counterfactual and the original design itself undermined the chance to 
make effective statements (Clemens and Demombynes, 2011). 
 
One of the strongest critiques of the concreteness and realism of UN Development Goals has 
been raised by William Easterly, author of “The White Man’s Burden”. He argues that 
Income today
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evidence gives no general proof that aid has a positive and large effect, and advances  many 
arguments against Sachs’s view. 
First, there is no empirical evidence of poverty traps: data show that the 20% poorest 
countries in 1950 had later on same average growth rates of richer countries, with no 
systematic difference between countries that underwent big push-inspired treatments and 
those which did not (Easterly, 2006). Moreover, some poor countries, such as China, India 
and Botswana reversed their conditions, becoming success stories. Plus, not all countries that 
are rated among the poorest today were so poor in 1950: their economic conditions fell from 
above, proving that the growth dynamics may not be as Sachs has theorized. Easterly (2006) 
concludes that, although some countries can be said to be in a poverty trap, there is no general 
statement for all developing countries (Easterly,2006). 
 
Moreover, there is little evidence for effectiveness of aid:  what Sachs takes for granted is that 
aid funds can positively affect growth of poor countries, but still this is a controversial issue, 
called by many to be a Micro-Macro Paradox, as explained before (Mosley, 1987). Planners 
and institutions validate and consider only parts of literature that support their approach, 
proving that aid of the West helps poor countries: the so-called “confirmation bias” (Easterly, 
2006). 
 
In Easterly’s opinion, having a bad government affects more than being eventually in a 
poverty trap: is corruption that creates and reinforces poverty, generating all other collateral 
results. He considers the scenario of 24 countries with bad institutions in 1984, which 
underperformed from 1895 until 2006, with on average 1.3% less growth. Controlling for 
both poverty trap and bad governments, its model proves the latter rather than the former to 
have a causal effect on such small growth (Easterly, 2006).  
 
Easterly also invokes the replacement of “social engineering” with a “piecemeal reform” 
approach. The former attitude towards development aims to transform society completely, 
activating all change agents at once, because all instruments are interdependent. Easterly 
recognizes in the first method, being adopted for long time, some possible drawbacks: in case 
something in the overall intervention does not work, its design makes difficult to split 
different causes. Secondly, such big plan requires lots of information and instrumentation 
available all together, therefore it is less feasible on a large scale. Moreover, it is so extended 
that it has no focus and does not allow for prioritization. Fourth, such method focuses on 
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majestic goals, rather than successful methods to solve the different little problems. Since it is 
carried on by multiple organizations, it lacks of accountability and no pressure is put on 
measuring results of each agency (Easterly, 2006).  
As a proof of failure of big top-down plans, he takes into account failures of shocks therapies 
in old communist countries transitioning to Capitalism (Easterly, 2006). “Piecemeal reform” 
approach rather arranges a sequence of small steps, to be carried on one at a time, considering 
socio-economical constraints and rewarding agents that bring better solutions. In Easterly’s 
opinion, each agency should adopt a piecemeal approach, looking for specific interventions 
that work on a small scale with empirical approach, and working on them together with local 
governments (Easterly, 2006).  
 
Finally, development is not a only technological problem, as Sachs believes: many 
developmental problems are rather institutional and economical. Focus should be therefore 
not only on technicality, but on developing an organic system of enforcement tools, 
incentives, evaluation systems in order to ensure that aid funds are really reaching the targeted 
poor (Easterly, 2006). 
2.7. Fostering social conflict 
There are some evidences that foreign aid can increase social conflict, although this 
relationship appears significant only in recipients with low income or led by weak 
governments.  
In particular, Besley and Persson (2011) argument that aid increases conflict only in presence 
of non-democratic institutions: receipt of aid funds triggers more takeover attempts by 
competitors, because holding the government becomes more desirable. 
According instead to Collier and Hoeffler (2002), the direct effect of aid on conflict is 
ambiguous and can only be determined empirically, since it could either increase desirability 
to rebel or strengthen government against internal opposition.  
Moreover, aid could help recipient government to diversify and decrease commodity export 
dependence, proven to increase chance of internal conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). 
Nunn and Qian (2014) also observe that food aid is related with an increase in conflict in 
many low income countries, by increasing variability related to food delivery timing, creating 
uncertainty. Gallego, Rubini and Batlle (2015) follow the same path and find that, in societies 
with low institutional quality and low expropriation costs of private activities, aid can foster 
social conflict. Their model shows that aid reception increases exogenously firms value but 
also incentivizes “trouble makers” in trying to expropriate such profitable firms. The resulting 
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social conflict (measured as number of battle deaths over total population) erodes partially the 
benefits produced by investments done, reducing growth: “conflict” is therefore a crucial 
instrumental variable. In case of good institutions however, aid may even reduce social 
conflict (Gallego et al., 2015).  
2.8. Contributing to political unaccountability and corruption 
Deaton (2013), Easterly (2003) and Rajan and Subramanian (2008) focus on political 
accountability: an increase in foreign aid, being unearned, lowers need of collecting taxes, and 
less need to appear accountable to citizen. Brautigam and Knack (2004) report that in Africa 
higher aid levels are on average associated with decline in tax revenues over GDP and of 
governance quality. Politicians tend to engage in rent-seeking activities, attempting to gain the 
more of the windfall gain they can, and trying to exclude unrelated actors from the political 
process (Djankov et al., 2008). 
Svensson (1999) notices in these circumstances a decreased provision of public goods, in 
spite of the increase in government revenue and even with the sole prediction of future aid 
flow. This detrimental behavior can be avoided by donors through imposing binding 
agreements, to reduce space for corruptive behavior (Svensson, 1999). 
 
The problem of corrupted and weak governments is one of the most controversial in regards 
to possible solution; still there is no consensus among donors on how to properly deal with it. 
First, a proper measure for corruption and mismanagement is difficult to assess: World Bank 
estimates present high error margins, and rating agencies have problems producing equal 
rankings. For example, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, an US organization founded  
under Bush mandate to give aid to countries achieving certain socio-political standards, 
reached an aid agreement with Honduras, believed to be a good government. That country 
was however ranked by World Bank as the worst third in the world for corruption (Easterly, 
2006). 
The second reason is that no common opinion exists about what donors should do regarding 
corruption. Should they give standards to meet, as foreigners? Should they live recipients to 
auto-determination? The current aid implementation shows a contradictory series of actions 
(Easterly, 2006).   
2.9. Increasing waste spending 
Finally, another detrimental effect that aid receiving may produce is waste in government 
spending. 
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Besley and Persson (2011) find that recipients with strong aid dependence tend to invest less 
in building state capacity, weakening their fiscal and legal systems; this consequently limits 
the range of policies reform a state is able to implement, and reduces effectiveness of all 
successive aid flows. 
Robinson and Torvik (2005) have developed the theory of so-called “white elephants”, which 
explains that the dismal effect of aid on growth is partially due to missal allocation of funds in 
big investment projects with negative social value, the ”white elephants”, in countries with 
low labor productivity. Incumbent governors find them attractive because they can credibly 
guarantee the electorate to carry them on, and thus they have a comparative advantage with 
respect to political competitors in the probability of being re-elected. A case they highlight is 
the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO) project in Zambia (Robinson and Torvik, 
2005).  
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3. Limits in models evaluating existing aid 
 
3.1. Endogeneity of aid  
One big issue that makes the evaluation of effectiveness of aid quite difficult is its 
endogeneity. Indeed, some allocation criteria of ODA favor recipients that are performing 
particularly badly, following the Good Samaritan hypothesis (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). 
Some other donors, on the other side, reward only well- performing recipients. In both cases, 
this creates a spurious correlation between ODA and growth that cannot be considered 
causality, because recipients have different initial growth rates that are not comparable on 
average (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). For examples, if aid is allocated to countries that 
have just experienced a natural disaster, a negative correlation between aid and growth can be 
expected (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). It is essential therefore to isolate the exogenous 
component of aid flow, but finding the correct instrument is far from easy. Rajan and 
Subramanian (2008) develop innovative instruments which focus on donor-recipient 
relationship and donors’ rather than recipients’ features. They suggest some possible control 
variables, such as colonial links and commonality of languages; these may isolate causal 
effect of aid on growth, making it exogenous (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008). Another 
solution could be to instrument aid with its initial and lagged values, not the contemporary 
ones, to wipe off effects related to the recipient’s specific level of growth (Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2008). 
3.2. Poor evaluation and model design 
A considerable part of literature has raised doubts about methods used to evaluate impact of 
foreign aid. An important contribution has been carried by Esther Duflo, co-author with 
Abhijit Banerjee of the book “Poor Economics”.  She asserts that, in humanitarian programs, 
good intentions are not sufficient and a rigorous evaluation should be implemented for social 
policies, in order to test which aid approach works in reality and to avoid wrong assessments 
and wastes that fuel pessimism over the utility of aid. The most convincing approach she 
suggests, taken from scientific resources, is the Randomized Controlled Trial (RCT) (Duflo, 
2012 and Qian, 2014).  
 
Among others, she criticizes the frequent poor estimate of counterfactual: in some cases 
treatment groups are not randomly selected, so it is not possible to assume that on average the 
only causal factor producing effect is the treatment itself. In these situations, a correct 
evaluation could be carried on only if transparent and observable criteria are provided to 
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separate each effect; this could be impossible when some environmental factors interact, 
further complicating the analysis (Clemens and Demombynes, 2011).  
Another effect which can hamper the validity of empirical results is the heterogeneity of 
impact: means comparisons among group and counterfactual may indeed prove a certain 
result of the treatment, but impact on each individual could be very different; if possible, it 
should be analyzed in each subgroup separately (Duflo, 2012). 
 
Duflo (2012) warns also in regards to potential spill-over effects: some programs may have 
positive or negative impact on other people or areas than the ones originally intended, 
therefore requiring to extend the evaluation analysis to a wider sample. An example could be 
the investment on infrastructure programs, which probably benefits also neighboring areas 
and facilitates creation of business networks.  
 
Another questionable element is the assumption of external validity: it happens in fact that 
micro-level studies are used to make hazardous inferences and previsions on a bigger scale, 
without valid economical foundations (Duflo, 2012). This can lead to clamorous mistakes in 
testing the effectiveness of aid, since not all successful treatments on a local scale will have 
the same impact on a wider horizon; some interventions (e.g. nutrition programs in India and 
Bangladesh) have also led to different results at the same aggregate level, depending on other 
variables, and taking a single result as general can lead to “cherry pick” generalization 
mistakes (Bourguignon et al., 2007). 
 
Mixed results that question effectiveness of aid are also a result of its poor categorization: id 
flows are often not clearly associated with targets, and even humanitarian aid, consisting in 
first emergency intervention, happens to be included, contributing to inconclusive evidences 
(Radelet and Clemens, 2004). 
Poor configuration in models regards also timing: the four-year period considered in many 
panel data is claimed to be too short to observe long-term effects of aid on growth, 
improvements in government policies and economic trends, and often biased by cyclical time 
effects (Radelet and Clemens, 2004). 
The best would be to take into account longer time periods, but it gets more difficult to isolate 
single effects from interaction with omitted factors. For this reason, some studies, such as 
Radelet and Clemens (2004), distinguish between many categories of aid before regressing 
the effects on growth:“humanitarian and disaster aid”  separated from “long impact aid” with 
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slow and longer term effect, and from “short impact aid” that likely produces effects on the 
standard four-year period. Considering only the last factor in the regression, we would usually 
find a robust effect on growth and diminishing returns at unusually high levels of aid (Radelet 
and Clemens, 2004). 
3.3. Omitted variable bias: policies and institutions 
The important impact of policies on growth has first been introduced in economic models by 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) through a policy index that enters in the regression of growth on 
aid. They indeed define the growth rate of developing countries as a result of initial income, 
institutional and policy distortions, aid and interaction effects between aid and policy 
distortion: they state that the overall marginal effect of aid is lower in presence of bad 
institutions. Without differentiating for policy, according to their studies aid has little impact 
on growth (Burnside and Dollar, 2000).  
The solution could be to focus on more specific definitions of aid and growth, in order to 
reduce the scope of issues under analysis. Otherwise it would be really difficult to develop a 
solid statement about aid effectiveness, because each type of aid has different measurement 
issues, produces different results and has a different timing (Qian 2014). Moreover, the more 
aggregated data are, the more difficult is to find exogenous instrumental factors that can 
isolate causality of aid, both in natural and experimental data (Qian, 2014). 
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4. Looking beyond growth: ODA and development 
 
Since no discernible average effect of aid on growth has been commonly agreed upon, I want 
to detect if foreign aid can still be considered beneficial in contributing to development in a 
wider meaning than sole GDP growth. Recently, many economists have raised doubts about 
the exhaustive validity of GDP as measure of effectiveness of aid. Other than the sole 
economic side, ODA should indeed aim to bring development in recipient countries, intended 
as the improvement of life quality and well-being for as many people as possible. The GDP 
itself, defined as the market value of goods and services sold in a year, recognized as the best 
functioning metrics to measure economic production since its introduction in the 1930s, 
ignores any kind of environmental and social effect. When it was introduced, a great hope in 
material progress reigned, and economic activity was considered the ultimate solution that 
could bring employment, raise incomes, fight poverty and create social cohesion (Costanza et 
al., 2014).  
Today, a new view is stepping in, recognizing that to measure the overall development of 
society a wider scope of measures should be considered: economists as Stiglitz argue that 
GDP has many flaws and is not even a good economic measure (Costanza et al., 2014). 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief review of other dimensions of development, to 
provide examples of innovative metrics used to capture them and to wonder if ODA is today 
delivering some positive results to this concern.  
 
If we look at World Bank’s definition of aid effectiveness, we find: “Aid effectiveness is the 
impact that aid has in reducing poverty and inequality, increasing growth, building capacity, 
and accelerating achievement of the Millennium Development Goals set by the international 
community. Indicators here cover aid received as well as progress in reducing poverty and 
improving education,  health, and other measures of human welfare.”(World Bank). 
Therefore, donor efforts should have a wider scope than sole economic growth; let me 
consider them in details. 
4.1. Poverty 
GDP growth and poverty reduction can go together, but they are not always paired: as Stiglitz 
says, «while growth may be necessary for sustained poverty reduction, it is not sufficient»: 
growth could happen at benefit of the already rich people, leaving poor people worse off 
(Stiglitz 2011).  
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Aid policy should take further steps and target not only GDP increase, but also reduction of 
depth and magnitude of poverty. There are two important concepts to be considered in this 
regards, which are relative and absolute poverty. 
“Relative poverty” is defined within a specific social context and it is useful to define the 
relative income levels within the same population (World Bank).  
Differently, “Absolute poverty” is defined as an absolute situation of living under an arbitrary 
poverty line, representing the average daily expenditure. Such threshold has been increased to 
1.25$/day in 2008 and to 1.90$/day in 2015, taking into account inflation. Some countries use 
also a national poverty line as domestic point of reference for redistributive policies (World 
Bank).  
ODA could be effective not in eradicating poverty but rather in alleviating its depth: it is 
measured by the “poverty gap index”, that is the ratio of the money needed to lift all people 
from below the poverty line, over the total population (also non-poor), expressed in 
percentages of the poverty line itself (World Bank). 
Although useful, these measures still focus on monetary poverty and are based on an arbitrary 
threshold, which could not be optimal for every single case. Moreover, these are not 
sufficiently detailed to considered the distribution of monetary poverty: the same poverty gap 
ratio could have different level of concentration in urban areas, depicting different situations. 
  
Recently among donors, a new awareness that ODA can affect the distribution of growth 
within poor countries is taking place. OECD has promoted the paradigm that a pro-poor 
pattern of aid, aiming at removing the obstacles that impede poor people to participate and 
benefit from growth trends, can be more effective in producing growth. Indeed, according to 
“OECD Promoting Pro-Poor Growth” (2006), aid policies have to be targeted to solve market 
failures, lacks of social protections and the vulnerability of lower social classes in order to 
eradicate the extreme poverty and allow poorest to benefit from growth at least as the other 
social classes, both in relative and absolute terms (OECD, 2006). 
The way ODA intervention is structured (i.e. timing, pace, persistency, inclusion) can produce 
very different effects. OECD reports a study by Ravallion (2004) which shows that increase in 
per capita income of 1% may reduce poverty from 4% to less than 1%, depending on 
conditions and policies applied. 
It is crucial in a pro-poor paradigm that donors promote good recipient governments which 
are accountable for the poorest and let them be heard and considered, with inclusive and 
decentralized policies implementation (OECD, 2006). 
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As said before, many aid donors rather pursue strategic goals: Collier and Dollar (2003) 
computed the poverty- efficient allocation that could maximize poverty reduction, and found  
that it has a correlation of only 0.57 with actual aid allocation; applying the most efficient pro-
poor strategy would allow to double the number of people lifted up from poverty.  
4.2. Education 
Another important contributor of development is education: such investment, bored by family 
and government, increases the quality of human capital and capabilities of a nation, can lead 
to higher incomes and living standards, and it is one of the ultimate drivers of development. 
Esther Duflo (2011) has lead an extensive analysis of the current programs and corresponding 
results: neither of these can give a comprehensive and exhaustive solution, since they are run 
on a small scale, but they can give some clues on possible improvements. Progress has been 
made: between 1999 and 2006, literacy rates in Sub-Saharan Africa increased from 56% to 
70%, and in South-East Asia from 75% to 86%. Besides these good results, Duflo enlists 
barriers of education-targeted aid: parents appear to be the biggest obstacle of school 
attendance, since due to direct (transport, textbooks, uniforms) and indirect (opportunity) 
costs, they deter children school enrolment and participation (Duflo, 2011). To overcome this, 
many local programs supported by World Bank and UN have given financial support to 
parents. Some critics argue that children impact is completely ignored, and giving aid directly 
to students would give an immediate response (Duflo, 2011). 
Being enrolled in school does not mean effective participation: in fact, one big issue is student 
absenteeism, due both to low motivation, underestimation of education benefits and to 
infective diseases. By designing programs that promote benefits of education and by 
cooperating with sanitation-targeted project it could be reduced, as some experiments prove 
(Duflo, 2011). 
School attending is however not enough to ensure effective learning: as a result of enrolment 
programs, classes are often overcrowded, with heterogeneous knowledge levels. Often 
teachers are not motivated, being absent from school or wasting teaching time in other 
activities: in a 2003 surprise test, absent teachers made up 16% of total in Bangladesh and 
27% in Uganda (Duflo, 2011); if present, they often did not teach. Additional resources can 
improve effective learning only if these are invested to improve pedagogical methods; for 
instance, hiring a supplementary teacher in Kenya has resulted to decrease teacher attendance 
by 25%, ceteris paribus. Hiring an additional teacher to downsize classes, and eventually 
differentiating by knowledge level, has proved to improve school quality, motivating more 
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both students (being part of an homogeneous class) and teachers (having less and more 
leveled students) (Duflo, 2011). 
Further complicating the analysis is the fact that education investments generally require a 
long time span to produce significant effects (Duflo, 2011). 
Still, lots of progress can be made: according to the UNESCO’s “EFA Global Monitoring 
Report on Education” (2015), 58 million children are not enrolled in school and, on average, 
100 million children do not end primary school, with growing inequality between rich and 
poor. In most country, education is not perceived as a priority and remains under-financed. 
Were funds are correctly seized, policy makers still focus on the traditional approach, 
ignoring alternative drivers such as students and teachers motivation (UNESCO, 2015 and 
Duflo, 2011). 
4.3. Health 
Another issue for many developing countries is health system: having a population weakened 
by diseases means lower productivity, lower salaries and, at aggregate level, lower growth, 
besides lowering the living standards. Poverty cannot be defeated without containing illness 
and contagion (Duflo, 2011). Every year, about 9 million children die before reaching five 
years of age, even if their illnesses, like measles or diarrhea, are easy to nurse and prevent. 
Similarly, every year 25 million children do not receive fundamental vaccines widely 
accessible. Also in this case, some experiments lead on a small scale can help to reflect on 
determinants of such poor outcomes and how ODA policies could be improved. In many 
countries, mortality and diseases have increased with sudden economic growth, such as India. 
Being the market not able to cope with increased food demand, population is undernourished, 
more fragile and exposed to infectious diseases (Duflo, 2011). In many recipients, public 
health sector is inefficient, too expensive or poorly developed, so that people rely on 
unqualified “doctors” in the informal sectors. As a response, often donors increase health 
budget, without undertaking a serious structural reform. An effective approach to tackle with 
health issues is to invest ODA budget in vertical funds, such as GAVI (Global Alliance for 
Vaccines and Immunization) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(Duflo, 2011 and OECD). 
4.4. Alternative measures of wealth 
New parameters have been introduced to capture also socio-environmental dimensions of 
development, such as the Adjusted Net National Income, which takes out from GNI the 
consumption of fixed capital and natural resources depletion (World Bank).  
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Adjusted Net Savings, instead, adds positive effects of education expenditure and negative 
effects of energy, mineral and forest depletion to economic national savings (World Bank).  
Finally, a notable parameter is the Human Development Index (HDI), which integrates the 
measure of economic living standards with other two key dimensions of human development, 
health and human capital, normalizing these all together (UNDP). 
4.5. Monetary inequality 
Some specific tools try to quantify the level of monetary inequality in a country; this is of 
massive importance in determining the effectiveness of ODA in poor countries, where the 
distribution of wealth is often uneven. One of most used metrics is the Gini coefficient, a 
number comprised between 0 and 100 that represents the extent to which the distribution of 
income deviates from a perfectly even distribution among citizen, being 0 the perfect equality 
(World Bank). 
 
4.6. Inequality of opportunities 
Income inequality itself considers only outcomes of human activities, not taking into account 
initial living conditions, which can have different specifications and determine economic 
conditions. 
One innovative measure in this direction is the Human Opportunity Index,  introduced by 
World Bank, based on the idea that different access to basic services have determinant effects 
on skills and knowledge acquisition and, further, on development in the long run. It measures 
the coverage gap in access to primary facilities, looking at the variation in rates by 
considering different socio-economic status. Low values of HOI represent an unequal society, 
while high values of HOI depict a society in which initial opportunities are more even (World 
Bank). 
The Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index, is similarly a “distribution-sensitive 
average level of HD”. Under ideal conditions of equality in health, education and income, 
IHDI equals to HDI, but as these social dimensions start to be unevenly accessible, the index 
is discounted and therefore falls below the conventional HDI (UNDP). 
4.7. Institutional quality 
A branch of studies has found aid to have a conditional effectiveness, depending on the 
presence of good institutional policies in recipient countries. In some cases, ODA itself can 
help to improve the quality of institutions in a country, importing good political practices, 
correcting useless bureaucratic excesses and rent-seeking practices. One of the most used is 
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the World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which provides a rating 
according to a set of 16 criteria grouped in four main clusters: economic management, 
structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector institutions and 
management (World Bank). 
Noticeable are also Worldwide Governance Indicators, introduced by World Bank to assess 
the quality of governance of a country based on six dimensions: 1) voice and accountability, 
2) political stability and absence of violence, 3) government effectiveness,4) regulatory 
quality, 5) rule of law, 6) control of corruption. Such intermediate components are derived 
from a variety of data sources and refer to views of both citizen and experts (World Bank). 
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5. Unraveling the paradox: successful and unsuccessful cases 
 
Analyzing some real cases can help to identify some policy suggestions and intuitions for the 
future of ODA. I will here take into consideration two recent examples of successful and 
unsuccessful Developing Economies, Botswana and Somalia respectively, to understand 
which role ODA has, what determinants have contributed in the former’s positive 
performance and which aid policy levers could be used in the latter case.  
I will later examine the Marshall Plan, the aid program which lifted Europe from poverty, 
looking at the teachings for today’s aid beyond some important differences. 
5.1. Botswana’s success story 
In spite of all negative evidence of aid effects on African countries, with pessimistic views of 
scholars defining Africa a “growth tragedy” (Easterly and Levine), Botswana has registered 
the highest per capita growth rate within the last 35 years globally. Its average annual growth 
rate between 1965-1998 has been 7.7%, with a forecasted 4% in 2016 (World Bank). Many 
scholars, such as Radelet and Clemens (2004), have recalled this case to adduce arguments in 
favor of aid optimism. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) attempt to define the 
determinants of such positive performance; in their belief the unique juxtaposition of many 
factors has produced such outcome, where none of these factors alone could have done. 
First of all, they find the existence of pre-colonial good performing and inclusive tribal 
institutions to be crucial. Some forms of popular assembly and public forums existed already 
with first settlement of Tswana group in eighteenth century, being unusual in other African 
tribal societies, and have been maintained later on. Post-Independence government since 1966 
has preserved this structure, establishing quite solid institutions that secured private poverty 
rights. Linguistic and ethnic integration with non-Tswana minorities has always occurred, 
before and after independence. Differently to its African neighbors, Botswana society was 
built on the cooperative integration between different tribes, resulting in great cultural 
homogeneity in the diversity (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002). 
All this in spite of adverse geographical conditions: Botswana landscape is arid, partly desert 
and landlocked, all factors which has been proved by some to have negative effect on growth  
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002 and Sachs). 
 
Moreover, despite exploitation practices in most countries, the effect of British colonialism on 
Botswana society was little, not being it an important trade haven. Even before the “Scramble 
for Africa”, tribal leaders asked England some military protection against Boers. In spite of 
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the increased colonial competition and discoveries of diamonds mines, the country was 
supposed to be annexed soon to South African colony, so British colonial presence kept being 
discreet (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002). 
With the rise of the National Party and the progressive nationalist movements in South Africa, 
the project of amalgamation with Botswana became less and less feasible, being abandoned in 
1961. In contrast to the Botswana People Party (BPP), presented as a strongly anti-colonial 
movement, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), lead by Seretse Khama, was able to 
integrate both existing hierarchy and new social classes, gaining a broad political base to win 
first elections in 1965 and maintaining a persistent leading position (Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2002).   
 
Third, private activities and institutional competition have not been threatened after 
independence, favoring structural investments. and maintaining political accountability 
towards citizen. Facing an important drought, the state accepted aid flows, especially from 
Scandinavian donors. Soon after, structural programs such as the Accelerated Rural 
Development Program in 1969, or lowering voting age, have been launched, together with a 
series of development plans, in order to attract foreign investors. Many cattle owners, the 
major social class, have become leading members of the National Assembly; in was in their 
same interest to invest in the development of agriculture, the main domestic manufacturing 
sector. Even when diamonds revenues overcame the agricultural ones, the security and 
stability of the long-history legitimated democratic government did not give them motives to 
abandon manufacturing investments and seek more urgent sources of income, like in other 
African states (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002).  
 
Fourth consideration is about Botswana’s diamonds abundance: differently from other 
national cases such as Congo, Zaire or Nigeria, the “resource curse” phenomenon did not take 
place here. Revenues from diamonds market have been invested efficiently in the government 
budget, and diamonds industry has managed to ration supply in order to maintain high prices 
in the market (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002). Such high rents have allowed to 
register persistent balance payment surplus and to invest in public sectors. Reports show that 
between 2002 and 2009 the poverty rate has decreased from 30.6% to 19.3%. Also the depth 
of poverty has eased: household incomes and consumption levels have risen particularly in 
rural areas (World Bank, 2016). 
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Throughout all aid era, Botswana has been a steady recipients, with temporary aid upsurge 
coinciding with droughts emergencies in the eighties (OECD). 
 
 
Source: OECD Qwids (2016) 
  
Nevertheless, some problems in Botswana society are still to be solved: among others, high 
inequality and high urban unemployment (World Bank). International reports suggest to 
address these issue by investing more in education and in private sector development. Another 
big issue is AIDS, with one of the highest incidences in the world: 25%-30% of the adults 
were estimated to be HIV-positive in 2002, creating risk of demographic crises (Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2002). Therefore, there are still challenges open for Botswana 
government in addressing these issues, sustained by international organizations. 
5.2. Somalia: a story of conflict 
Despite being a country with relatively similar geopolitical characteristics, Somalia presents a 
totally different series of events: it highlights how dysfunctional pre-colonial institutions can 
deeply harm a nation’s well-being (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002). 
Differently from most African countries, it has been not only a state but a nation: it was not 
really a result of arbitrary subdivision ‘in the scramble for Africa’ of different colonial 
empires, but rather a population with a well-established common identity (Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2002). 
Also here the British colonial empire did not really affect political institutions: it was a 
strategic outpost in the Horn of Africa, to move further in internal zones and control the sea-
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lane between Suez canal, India and the Far East. Despite this, the Somali state has suffered 
from deep political instability since its original tribes, competing over scarce resources. These 
factions survived the independence shift, up to actual political factions (Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson, 2002). What really contributed to the series of civil conflicts therefore was not 
ethnic diversity, but rather the degree of political instability, as argued by Fearon and Laitin 
(2003). 
Since the 1980s, various armed rebel groups started to engage in guerrilla against the leading 
party, removing it in 1991. The power vacuum originated led competing groups to persistent 
clashes, causing UN intervention; three different semi-autonomous territories coexisted, 
named Somaliland, Puntland and Mogadishu region (si veda Maystadt and Ecker, 2014). In 
late 1990s, two autonomous governments were established in the north and gave a break to 
ongoing conflict. In the early 2000s, many radical Islamic groups as Al-Shabaab formed, so 
Ethiopian troops intervention was needed to seize them in the south. In these years, many 
droughts and famines have hit the country, with the harshest being between 2010 and 2012. 
The Federal Government of Somalia was finally established in 2012, although it remains a 
fragile state, due to both the political inner instability and to many economic and 
demographical issues derived from the famines (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002). 
Indeed, the Fragile State Index define Somali situation as a ‘very high alert’, being the second 
most fragile in the ranking at scoring 114 out of 120 of overall fragility (OECD).  
 
ODA flow, kept quite steady between 1960-1975, has picked in 1993, followed by a sudden 
decline occurred in 1996-2000, and a renewed recent increase (OECD). 
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 Source: OECD Qwids (2016) 
 
Despite the massive inflow, the estimated size of humanitarian needs is even bigger: UN 
estimates say that in 2014 aid met only 12% of effective humanitarian aid needed, with large 
part of population suffering from severe malnutrition (Africa Research Bulletin, 2014). The 
difficulty in last years has been to face many chained issues, difficult to disentangle. Scholars 
in fact show that slow economic growth contributed to rise of civil conflict, as well as adverse 
weather and rainfall variability, especially in absence of governmental policies able to cope 
with such climate change (Maystadt and Ecker, 2014). Particularly, occurrence of drought 
downsized economic revenues of livestock market, the mainstay of Somali economy (it 
accounts for 40% of total GDP), reducing the opportunity costs to engage in civil conflict. 
Moreover, in front of reduced revenues from livestock rearing, a weak credit market and 
absent social safety nets provided little support to impoverished farmers (Maystadt and Ecker, 
2014). 
5.3. Marshall Plan and the origin of ODA 
Marshall Plan is recognized by some as the most effective economic recovery program in 
whole history: it regarded a pool of countries, which underwent similar socio-political event, 
and aimed to rebuild economic and financial stability (De Long and Eichengreen, 1991).  
Marshall Plan could resemble some similarities with nowadays’ foreign aid, in particular with 
ODA flows to African countries, since both consist of an agreed set of common rules, criteria 
and pooling systems of aid flow into bigger organizations: the OEEC at that time and UN, 
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OECD and World Bank agencies today. Moreover, in both cases aid regards a whole 
continent (Europe before and Africa then), made up of countries experiencing different 
development stages, although bonded by common history and culture. 
I therefore want to analyze its effects of European economy, by depicting the general features 
and by isolating its contribution to economic growth.  
5.3.1. Historical background 
The Second World war had left death and destruction all over Europe, killing over 8 million 
people in western Europe and over 9 million in Central and Eastern Europe. The economic 
damage was also huge, with most countries jumping back to GDP levels of the beginning of 
20th century; as an example, Austria was at 1886 levels, France at 1891 levels, Germany at 
1908 levels (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2015). 
Conditions were critical, with widespread hunger and food rationing. Germany, one of 
conflict’s main actors, had to face destruction of about a quarter of its capital stock compared 
to pre-war levels (Comin and Hobijn, 2010). Agriculture and coal industry were the most 
wounded sectors, and European capacity of importing resources from outside was minimal 
(De Long and Eichengreen, 1991). Intra-European trade was hindered by lack of foreign 
currency, its role in international exchange had been replaced and no international authority 
existed that could re-organize international trade. The UN Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA), founded in 1943 to give support to weakened belligerent countries, 
spent around 4 billion dollars on emergency food, medicines and general humanitarian aid, 
helping displaced Europeans to come back to mother-country and building refugee camps for 
the ones who did not want to be repatriated (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2015). 
 
At the same time, hostility started to increase between US and URSS, each federation 
representing a different economical and political model: the main proponent of capitalist 
doctrine on one side and the fortress of soviet union on the other (Ozer, 2014). The problems 
had three main roots: the first were difficult economic conditions in Europe and the need to 
guarantee themselves from risk of overproduction and excessive surplus; the second consisted 
in the threat of empowered communist parties in Greece, Italy and France, which could favor 
the soviet advancement in Europe. Finally, US wanted to contain Germany’s possible drives 
and create a secure and peaceful European environment, under the guide of UK allies. George 
Marshall, US Secretary of State, declared US would offer financial assistance to all European 
nation “west of the Urals”, conditioned that they could define a common program for 
reconstruction: the so-called Marshall plan or European Recovery Program (ERP). EU 
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response came soon after: the CEEC (Committee for European and Economic Cooperation) 
was founded in Paris in 1947, as an assembly of initially 16 members, with duty of defining 
priorities and give a common estimation of aid needed to rescue Europe (De Long and 
Eichengreen, 1991). 
Also Turkey was included, as a reward of military assistance in the last war period, in spite of 
its neutral position, and recognizing its key position as belt cushioning Europe from Soviet 
threat. Other beneficiaries were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and United 
Kingdom (Ozer, 2014). 
US insisted particularly that the management, distribution and control of aid funds would be 
left to recipient countries, to increase their autonomy and self-determination. The CEEC 
therefore set up a permanent organism for this purpose, called Organization for European and 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC). 
Somehow, OEEC was a global organization: although US and Canada did not officially 
participate to the assembly, they were invited as auditors to the works; representation of the 
colonies and overseas territories was left to parent countries.. When also Canada and US 
joined officially, it changed name in Organization for European and Economic Development, 
still actor of international politics and development issues nowadays (De Long and 
Eichengreen, 1991). 
 
Starting from half of 1948, large aid inflow started to arrive in Europe. US created in that 
same year the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to manage aid flow. A 
multilateral approach was adopted: each member of OEEC had to present US a projection of 
its gross national product, domestic savings, investment requirements over a five-year period. 
All funds had later to be divided by common agreement among all states, finding a 
momentum between competing needs and demands. A special agency was also set up in each 
recipient state, with one US representative and members of public and private sector, and 
responsible of developing a proposal of bilateral agreement as foundation of the subsequent 
aid flow (CVCE 2015 and Ozer 2014).  
Between April 1948 and June 1951, it totally amounted for almost 13 billion dollars of the 
direct level, 9 of which were given in grants (De Long and Eichengreen, 1991).  
 
  "Marshall Plan aids in total (000 $)" from Ozer, 2014. Source: Erhan (1996)
Aid was given in two levels: the first, so
credit, while the second or indirect
certain amount of goods from US or other European Countries, with the idea of sustaining 
each other’s economy in the reconstruction path. As an example, Germany, Engl
Belgium were the countries
1949-1950 (Ozer, 2014). In
private firms by paying cash or using Marshall Credit, depositing preliminarily a certain share 
to the competent ministry. Beside, technical as
sent to US to directly acquire
agricultural and production techniques were organized 
This, together with new equipment, gave a great boost to productivity both in agriculture and 
industry: thanks to new US equipment, both 
in efficiency, reaching way higher output values in following years (Ozer, 2014
Specifically to fill the huge productivity gap before
“Technical Assistance and 
transfer; promotion of development trainees
Productivity . Results came soon after: sources say that industries
increased by 20% to 25% within a sole year, 
Hobijn, 2010 and CVCE, 2015
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 payments and rudimental trade channels still left from war. In fact, many EU countries went 
on bankrupt after 1945, so that many of their trades were lead using barter. The creation of the 
European Payment Union (EPU), which lasted between July 190 and December 1958, 
allowed to multi-lateralize such bilateral agreements, with each EPU member having the 
overall surplus or deficit with respect to all countries; in this way nations did
something directly something to each other, so that any preference in importing or exporting 
from particular debt-bonded country disap
barriers, foster growth of incomes and internal
Integration” seeming more economically attractive (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2015).
5.3.2. Impact on Economic Growth
Discussions in literature have been made over the 
European recovery and later sustained growth.
The main shared thesis is that it was not the main driver of the good economic 
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Eichengreen, 1991). 
 
44 
peared. This allowed to reduce
 trade, and made the idea of an
 
economic impact of Marshall Program on 
  
ictory of democracy after years of 
 these factors contributed to foster
-1951 (De Long and Eichengreeen, 1991). Average 
-war levels (De Long and 
 not owe 
 intra-EU trade 
 “European 
 
outcome, but it 
irms Burnside 
actors in the 
 growth 
 
45 
 
“Economic Growth in European Nations During the Marshall Plan Years” (De Long Eichengreen, 1991) 
 
Although each country experienced its unique growth path, I can identify some common 
positive contributions that have made Marshall Plan effective to bring growth. 
First, it gave back to Europeans a renewed trust in market, which had been lost after the Great 
Depression in the thirties. Skepticism against liberism, proven to fail, had been reinforced by 
curiosity for the apparent soviet economic miracle, and by the consolidated government 
control established in war years (De Long and Eichengreen, 1991). Reminding the Great 
Depression and fearing liberal policies, many governments were instead prone to regulations 
and interventions. With US Plan, a shift occurred, dismantling products and factors’ control 
and restoring internal and intra-state markets (De Long and Eichengreen, 1991). 
 
Moreover, differently from UNRRA, it was a multi-year commitment, not simply targeted at 
plugging humanitarian holes: governments could rely on such steady flow, while 
implementing internal reforms and reconstruction (De Long and Eichengreen, 1991). 
 
Evidence shows that the Second World War has been harsher than the previous, with more 
sophisticated weapons, more deaths and more scattered economic damages, but the following 
recovery was faster and less erratic. According to De Long and Eichengreen (1991), that is 
because, after the first world conflict, Europe had a more unstable socio-political situation: the 
burden distribution of war reparations was unresolved and each social category, and state at 
an higher level, sought to promote their aggressive claim for a favorable redistribution (De 
Long and Eichengreen, 1991). In the Marshall Plan’s frame instead, great political effort and 
propaganda was put to favor steps towards a closer integration among European states, and 
each state found more favorable to cooperate for a distribution of the resource pool received 
with the Plan, instead of claiming a better reparation single treatment (De Long and 
Eichengreen, 1991).  
 
Another big benefit was the relief from strong exchange rate constraints: aid was given in 
dollar, at that time the strongest value currency to obtain desired imports, and it produced 
general equilibrium good secondary effects and access to many resource markets. This 
allowed to import products at higher rate, relieving internal bottlenecks. 
Contributing to rebuild trust and stability, Marshall Plan helped also to raise investments by 
35%: it was essential, since tax base had been eroded by the war, strongly constraining public 
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expenditure. Public infrastructures were quickly rebuilt, ensuring viability and connections for 
newborn industries (De Long and Eichengreen, 1991). 
 
Specifically to some countries, a factor contributing to economic growth and related to the 
Marshall Plan, although not directly, is the renewal of a more solid “social contract” between 
governments, workers and employers (De Long and Eichengreen 1991, Comin and Hobijn 
2010). While, after First World War, each state tried to maximize its immediate national 
income, with all subsequent strikes, inflation, coordination problems, here social parties 
preferred to focus on increasing productivity, to ensure higher living standards later on. 
Marshall Funds gave incentive to commonly agree on a wage moderation policy, alleviating 
the labor-market conflict. Such trend could have derived also from the elastic supply of 
underemployed rural labor, in a period of agricultural shortage, and from memory of 
unemployment and hardship in the inter-war period they wanted to avoid (De Long and 
Eichengreen, 1991). 
 
Marshall Plan moreover required a direct government responsibility: recipient countries had 
to sign a bilateral pact with US, committing to restore and buttress financial stability, 
exchange rates and balance in budgets. This worked at the same time an incentive tool, since 
governments had to meet such criteria in their internal stabilization plans, and an enforcement 
tools, in case some countries did not align. US had indeed a veto power in such cases, 
impeding countries to divert aid in other uses or cutting it proportionately to the amount 
diverted. For instance, West Germany had aid suspended until the nationalized railway had 
revenues that could bring budget balance (De Long and Eichengreen, 1991). 
 
Initial GDP growth rates at the beginning of Marshall Plan were way higher than before, 
leading some scholars to talk of “super-growth”. This is explained thinking of Solow neo-
classical growth model, were capital accumulation has diminishing returns on production: 
capital accumulation jumped back at really low levels, since a huge part got destroyed during 
the war, and at that value each marginal increase had higher returns on GDP than before the 
war (Comin and Hobijn, 2010).  
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 Output differentials pre and post-war 
Evidence shows that some recipients, such as Germany, after recovery kept having a much 
faster GDP growth, not converging again to pre-war GDP rates, the so-called “Solow 
equilibrium”. Comin and Hobijn (2010) argue that differences in growth rates were due to 
differences in the cost of adopting new technologies, so that some countries benefited more 
than others from US technology transfers and trainees. This meant faster and broader 
technological adoption, which consequently increased productivity and GDP growth (Comin 
and Hobijn, 2010). They moreover find that adoption of old technologies decreased in 
countries which underwent Marshall Plan, while new technologies in such countries 
increased. Therefore, Marshall Plan is proved to have favored technological progress and 
abandonment of obsolete instrumentation, towards more productive machinery (Comin and 
Hobijn, 2010).  
 
5.3.3. Differences with contemporary ODA 
Despite being Marshall Plan and ODA somehow resembling (especially considering the 
latter’s programs targeted at African continent), many diverging points can be noticed. I will 
identify some of them, which could be useful in our analysis of aid impact. 
1) Different strategic reasons 
We can recognize different motives and expectations between US intervention in 1948 and 
today’s ODA to poor countries. Truman and his ministers believe that without a solid 
Capital invested
(dollars)
Imput increase
(post-war level)
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functioning political European institutions, trade and markets the international stability would 
have been at stake, with Soviet advancement looming from East. Europe had a millennial 
history and was considered to be the head of civilization and progress, together with the 
advancing US society, and the main US trade partner, so  its stability had to be restored not to 
be harmed in the long term (Easterly, 2006). Strong of a solid bipartisan political support, 
Truman government devoted to Marshall plan more than 1% of GNP in the years 1948-1952 
(De Long and Eichengreen, 1991).  
 
Looking at today’s ODA, US has no direct harm in maintaining third world poor, and by off-
shoring low cost economic activities it can maintain its economic predominance. It has never 
been considered the core of modern progress, and its political instability does not undermine 
US politics. A strong media campaign has been carried on too, but focusing instead on the 
role of US as a model donor or savior. This patronizing mind-set of exporting western model, 
instead of providing tools and ensuring good governance practices, so that each country can 
then auto-determine itself, is evident also in planners ’speeches: «it’s up to us», «our 
generation’s challenge», «we will help you build the capacity» (Easterly, 2006).  
European donors, on the other hand, are former colonizers of recipient countries: aid is given 
not to restore a lost cooperation, but built on century of exploitation of natural resources and 
human capital. Colonial bondage is still relevant, as Alesina and Dollar (2000) show us.  
 
2) Different implementation 
Marshall Plan was designed to create development to countries previously trade partners to 
US, according to criteria given by donors and agreed upon with recipients, within some limits. 
Eastern Bloc countries indeed were offered such aid, but they refused since they did not 
accept conditions. Today, at the opposite, still some bad-performing institutions receive aid 
for the sake of fighting poverty, even if some of them persist in maintaining wrong practices 
(Lockwood, 2005). In Marshall Plan, each state set up with US  a country-specific Economic 
Cooperation Administration, acting as country’s development banks and loaning money only 
to business that met criteria (Hubbard and Duggan, 2009). The belief was the each country 
could identify better than anyone its internal issues and allocate internal resource in 
autonomy; as Easterly would say, «the poor are their own best Searchers» (Easterly 2006, 
p.27). Then, all Marshall recipients had to find a common ground on the subdivision of the 
commonly pooled funds, tightening reciprocal accountability and responsibility. 
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Looking at actual aid, things are different. For many years, donors had covered advantage to 
keep recipients poor and oblige them to buy donor-exported goods, providing overpriced 
technical assistance (TA). Some scholars claim that actual development aid is just the 
evolution of old colonialist approach: what was meant as the ‘uncivilized’ has become the 
‘underdeveloped’, who was said to be ‘savage people’ have become the ‘third world’. The 
intention seemed not to lift poor countries from poverty, since that would have meant to 
recognize their political independence and authority and not being able to exert a control over 
their policies anymore (Easterly, 2006).  
  
3) Pre-existing development and human capital 
In case of the Marshall Plan, all beneficiaries were developed countries, each in different 
stages, deeply harmed by the war. The following growth process, supported by US funds,  
aimed to rebuild previous infrastructures and economic activities; thanks to high level of 
human capital and knowledge, many states were able to reach higher growth rate equilibriums 
(Comin and Hobijn, 2010). De Long and Eichengreen (1991) even argue that most part of 
reconstruction was completed by the time the Plan was set on, thanks to UNRRA and the 
“interim aid”. It mattered mainly through rebuilding trust in market and trade and through 
giving the incentives for market openness and free trade to be reestablished (De Long 
Eichengreen, 1991). 
Actual ODA, on the other side, is destined to countries with a long colonial past, which have 
maintained persistent low growth rates since their independence from colonizers. An 
important branch in literature argues that economic development is strongly linked with the 
spread and absorption of new techniques and technologies, which ultimately depends on the 
level of culture and human capital. Among others, Mokyr arguments that technological 
change, great contributor to economic growth, ultimately depends on what happens to the 
“useful knowledge”, that is applicable for economic progress. Squicciarini and Voigtlaender 
(2015) have proved that such useful knowledge, in the case of the Industrial Revolution, was 
endowed by the upper tail of human capital distribution, that is by the knowledge elites that 
achieve also upper education, differently from the masses. Mokyr (2013) arguments that the 
type of education that fosters economic growth differs with the distance of the country from 
the “world technology frontier”, i.e. the most efficient use of resources developed so far. 
Developing countries, still distant from development frontier, need to invest in mass 
education to catch up, while more advanced countries need to develop higher education to 
push the frontier further (Mokyr, 2013).  
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At this regard, we find important differences between Marshall recipients and today’s 
recipients. In Europe, in 1940 (just before the war) the literacy rate was 84% in Germany, 
85% in Spain, 88% in Belgium, even 95% in the Netherlands (UNESCO Literacy, 2016). 
Such developed, industrialized and educated nations have been defined as the “convergence 
club”, pulling ahead the rest of the world. Such high levels of mass and upper education 
allowed them to catch up , to resume their infrastructures and to fill quickly the technological 
gap respect to US economy (Mokyr, 2013). 
Today’s developing countries show different figures, with only 52% of them having achieved 
universal primary education by 2015 (UNESCO, 2015). Actual mean years of schooling is 6.4 
in developing and 4.1 in the least developed ones, against 11.8 of highly developed countries. 
Although much effort has been carried on in many countries to achieve higher rates of 
primary education, adult literacy and upper education still fail in providing satisfying figures. 
The rate of gross enrollment in upper secondary education, important in favoring growth and 
innovation, is on average 35% in the whole Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP, 2014). 
Therefore, European countries had much more developmental levers of human capital to 
count on, in taking the growth track.  
 
4) Role of institutions 
What Lockwood (2005) notices is that often, by invoking a sort of Marshall Plan for Africa 
and pretending to replicate some of its successful features, economists forget the central role 
that bad performing institutions have in keeping African countries poor. European States 
coming out from the Second World War had a previous history of political internal stability 
and maturity, with some older democracies and some younger ones (i.e. Italy, 1861) which 
still experienced a political consolidation process. 
Moreover, all these states were bonded by the common ground value of modernity, 
established with Enlightenment and with French Revolution. The post-war politics saw a 
strong democratic shift, where many authoritarian governments ruling during the war were 
dismantled, so that all states that agreed upon the Plan conditions shared common democratic 
values. Spain, were Francisco Franco had established his dictatorship in 1939, was excluded 
from Marshall Plan, in the same way that Soviet Union and satellites refused to undergo the 
program (Lockwood, 2005). 
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In African countries the story is completely different: having a long history as former colonies 
from 16th century until 1940s (with 1941’s Atlantic Charter) and 1950s, the majority still 
lacks a solid democracy and has weak and corrupted governance, which is proven to reinforce 
poverty (Easterly, 2006). Many of these countries’ borders were arbitrarily defined by 
European states  in a series of Congress meetings held between 1880 and the First World War, 
to pursue their imperialist commercial interests: the so called ‘scramble for Africa’. Such 
newborn fragile states did not undergo the long historical process of national identity 
development that all European states had, generating big fragilities since the beginning, and 
giving a chance for European dominators to develop a new form of more subtle commercial 
dependence: the New Imperialism (Easterly, 2006). 
 
5) Temporary tool with exit strategy 
Marshall plan was designed as a temporary development tool, with an established built-in exit 
and incentives for independence. It was indeed designed to last between 1947 and 1951 and 
the 13 billion dollars given consisted of grants, with no concessional loans: a temporary and 
exceptional opportunity to take advantage of (Brautigam and Knack, 2004).  
All European recipients were aware that such funds, being tied to restore financial stability 
and to relax investment constraints, were limited to a short period; thus they committed to 
maximize the benefits obtainable. Current ODA is differently structured and based on 
performance indicators, with the risk of granting endless aid to the same countries, without 
holding their governments responsible to implement an effective developmental plan within a 
certain timeframe (Brautigam and Knack, 2004). 
Brautigam and Knack (2004) argument that to help countries to graduate from poverty, 
especially for HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries), some measures of debt relief are 
necessary, to avoid poorest countries to carry unbearable burdens that will always impede a 
development twist. This would allow both donors and recipients to agree on concessional 
loans over 10-20 year period, to be invested in specific targets and paired with a set of 
reforms to implement. Today, even imagining a temporary tool for ODA, timing would need 
to be longer than Marshall’s years, since the level of human capital, economic development 
and persistency of social issues are way worse than in after-war Europe. Brautigam and 
Knack (2004) suggest a time frame of 40 years. 
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6. Policy recommendations and perspectives 
 
As we have seen, no absolute verification on aid effectiveness has been made so far;  many 
critics have pointed out structural drawbacks of ODA, making what is today called “aid 
debate”. Many different econometrics models have been developed, leading in some cases to 
disputable results that depend on the metrics and configurations used, making the dilemma 
over ODA even more articulated. In my opinion, it is important for international organisms 
such as World Bank, UN and OECD to question programs actually implemented and to 
concert together a unified new approach to ODA, spending more time on testing effectiveness 
of single intervention and not expecting to apply the same strategy to all specific country 
cases. New emphasis should be put to innovative financing tools for development, that are 
new approaches for pooling private and public revenue streams, new revenue streams 
themselves, and new incentives and mechanisms to address market failures. More and more 
these new devices, such as vertical funds, FDI and specific aid bonds, can complement ODA 
in times of increased resource constraints. In the re-designing process, ODA should aim to go 
beyond GDP growth and adopt a multi-target strategy, understanding that development has 
many determinants to be considered. 
Looking at the two country cases, we see how foreign aid in order to be effective needs a 
ground of solid democratic institutions in recipient countries: both confirm the third 
hypothesis that recipients policies have a crucial role in determining aid outcomes, and cannot 
be ignored (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002). The conditional effectiveness of aid is 
gaining importance in donors decisions, particularly with World Bank’s Performance Based 
Allocation (PBA) system. In general, donor countries, agencies and policymakers have 
recognized the crucial implication that aid should be distributed selectively to well-
performing countries in respect to policies.  
Establishing good governments often comes after a gained independence and auto-sufficiency 
of the country, as in Botswana case, where colonial presence has not been to pressing and has 
allowed to preserve an integrated and pluralistic society, which can be a credible counterpart 
in ODA reception. In other cases, such in the Somali one, detrimental governments left alone 
can only worsen the country’s condition. The challenge of today ODA, indeed, is to find the 
proper balance between respecting each country’s self-determination and intervening where 
needed, by enforcing policy conditionality on aid. Intervention in countries’ policy making 
cannot be however a top-down, paternalistic action and with the presumption to have better 
understanding of the country’s specifics. A cooperative work should be done between donors 
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and recipients, to define ”from inside” proper solutions, feasible by the recipient country and 
which can make it autonomous in the future.  
In case of recipient country’s non-cooperation, the debate is open upon whether donors should 
refuse to provide aid, enforcing conditionality and punishing the authoritarian or corrupted 
government, or if they should intervene anyway, for the sake of combating poverty and 
provide support to the poorest who have no voice in determining their government’s choice. 
In my opinion, DAC countries should intervene using proper means which do not provide 
financial means to the government, but targeting at needs; this could be made by avoiding 
official support through bilateral or multilateral channel, and by using vertical funds or new 
forms of public and private partnerships (PPP) instead. 
 
Moving forward, also Marshall Plan leads to some valuable considerations. It shows the 
importance of building accountable and structured organisms that concert aid distribution 
among a group of countries tied by similar socio-political and economical conditions. 
Specifically, the OEEC had the essential duty of portioning aid flow among European 
countries based on agreed plans, of ensuring a reciprocal check on investment choices and, at 
the same time, to align economic policies and reform, towards an integrated Europe. Results 
of this path is the OECD organism, still existing today to tackle economic and political 
challenges through country cooperation.  
As the Marshall Plan did with the EPU and the multilateral approach, also DAC countries 
should set the ambitious goal of favoring economic empowerment and set-on of commercial 
networks, to help poor countries to definitely lift from poverty. This can be made by investing 
ODA funds in developing local human capital and expertise, by adopting more favorable 
trade tariffs and some sort of financial support, to sustain the creation of a prosper private 
sector. Some calls of this sort have already been made, as Gordon Brown in 2005 asking for a 
“Marshall Plan in Africa” with a structured plan, “Make Poverty History”; still the focus was 
on big results and not on testing on the ground the most effective intervention, with a 
Searcher approach (Duflo, 2011 and Easterly, 2006). I’m confident that actual financial 
restriction in national budget will favor such renovation process, towards a more and more 
effective aid.  
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